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中文摘要：
论文构建基于政府、制造商和零售商的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型，比较研究零售市场在垄断和竞争两种情形下，博弈参与方各自的最优决策，碳税在市场参与者间的转嫁和重新分配，以及消费者环保意识和二氧化碳价格等因素对均衡决策和社会福利的影响．研究结果表明，垄断和竞争两种情形下，最优碳税税率均随消费者环保意识的增大而增大；当消费者环保意识或碳价格较高时，政府对制造商按最优税率征收碳税可以有效提高社会福利；即使消费者环保意识或二氧化碳价格较低，政府对高碳排放量制造商征收碳税也是尤为必要的；当最优碳税税率值难以计算时，直观税率值可以作为政府制定碳税税率时的一个次优选择；且零售市场的竞争强度越大时，直观税率越接近最优税率．
英文摘要：
This paper constructs a three-stage Stackelberg game model based on government, manufacturer and retailer, and comparatively analyse the optima] decisions of each participant, the transfer and distribution of carbon tax among different participants, and the impact of consumers＇ environmental awareness and carbon dioxide price on equilibrium decisions and social welfare when the retail market is in monopolization or competition. The results show that, in two supply chain structures, the optimal carbon tax rate increases with the increase of consumers＇ environmental consciousness; When consumer environment awareness or carbon dioxide price is high, carbon tax regulation can effectively improve social welfare. Even if the consumer environment awareness or carbon dioxide price is low, it is necessary for the government to impose carbon tax on manufacturers with high carbon emissions. When the optimal carbon tax rate is difficult to calculate, the intuitive tax rate can be used as a suboptimal choice for the government to implement a carbon tax regulation; and the greater the intensity of competition in the retail market, the more the intuitive tax rate closer to the optimal tax rate.
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