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中文摘要：
在一个自然实验的框架下，本文考察了我国2007年《物权法》实施后，债权人求偿保护对上市公司债务融资决策的影响。研究发现，法制改革后，债权人强势监管和求偿威胁造成了债权人激励与终极控制人规避两方面的影响。相对于两权分离度低的终极控制人而言，两权分离度高的终极控制人的规避效应更为明显，具体表现为：（1）从债务融资规模来看，终极控制人两权分离度高的上市公司将更大幅度地缩减其债务融资规模，尤其是银行债务规模；（2）从债务期限结构来看，债权人求偿保护强化了短期债务的治理效应，终极控制人两权分离度高的公司将更大幅度地减少其短期债务，变相地增加治理效应较弱的长期债务。
英文摘要：
The ＂Property Law＂ of China has been implemented in 2007, under this natu- ral experiment framework which has been rising up the creditors＇ claims protection, this paper examines its actual implementation effect on debt financing decision of listed companies. It finds the law reform has led to both the incentive effect of creditors and the avoiding effect of ultimate controller,furthermore, compared to the low degree of two-rights separation which caused by the divergence of cash flow rights and voting rights, the ultimate controller whose two-rights separation in the high degree has more obvious avoiding effect, and the empirical results are primarily reflected in two aspects： （1） through the regression results of debt fi- nancing scale, we find that the ultimate controller of listed companies whose two-rights sepa- ration in high degree has been reducing more greatly debt financing scale, especially the scale of bank debt; （2） through the regression results of debt maturity structure, we find that cred- itor claims protection has been rising up the governance effects of short-term debt, the ulti- mate controller of listed companies whose two-rights separation in high degree has been re- ducing short-term debts more greatly, in some sense, increasing the long-term debt which has the weaker governance effect at the same time.
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