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中文摘要：
文章在理论分析的基础上,提出大股东控制框架下CEO变更的五大假设,并以此为视角,基于上交所上市公司2004-2006年公司治理的实践,在运用Logistic回归模型进行实证检验的基础上,对上市公司内部治理机制的效率进行评价。研究发现：（1）能力假设获得证实,表明内部治理机制治理效应的存在;（2）合谋假设获得支持,大股东控制权私利弱化其对CEO的监督;（3）董事会独立性假设得以证实,且董事会履职倾向保守和谨慎;（4）就现阶段的股权结构而言,大股东的利益协同与利益模糊假设同时获得证实。
英文摘要：
On the basis of theoretical analyses,the paper raises five hypotheses of CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders.Then,based on the corporate governance of listed companies on SSE from 2004 to 2006,it evaluates the efficiency of internal governance mechanisms by Logistic regression model.To some extent,it confirms the five hypotheses aforementioned,namely ability hypothesis,collusion hypothesis,board dependence hypothesis,convergence-of-interest hypothesis and fuzzy interest hypothesis.In addition,the ability hypothesis makes the existence of the governance effects of internal governance mechanisms clear.The private benefit of control of large shareholders has the negative effect on their supervision over CEO.It also indicates the performance of the board is featured by a conservative and prudent tendency.
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