中文摘要：

改革开放以来,中国的经济增长态势举世瞩目,而政府在推动经济增长的过程中发挥了巨大作用。在政府运行过程中,政府行为更多地取决于官员个人的素质和追求。因此,合理的官员激励和监督机制,是中国经济长期稳定增长的重要制度保证。但现实情况是,官员晋升激励在促进可度量的经济发展指标不断增长的同时,却忽视了经济增长的长期性和稳定性,以全要素生产率衡量的经济增长绩效提升缓慢。基于2002—2013年我国省际面板数据,从国家审计提高政府效率、优化官员激励机制的角度,可考察国家审计治理在增进地区经济增长绩效中的作用。官员的晋升激励越强,其所在地区以全要素生产率衡量的经济增长绩效越差,而国家审计治理则明显抑制了官员晋升激励对经济增长绩效的负面影响。国家审计在提升经济增长绩效方面起到了重要的治理作用。

英文摘要：

Since the reform and opening up, China＇ s economy has made remarkable achievement, doubtlessly, the government role is enormous in promoting the growth. In the process of government operation, the government behavior relies heavily on officials＇ personal quality and ambition, and, therefore, an appropriate incentive and supervision mechanism is an important institutional guarantee for China＇ s long-term economic growth. But in reality, while the official promotion incentives have promoted the measurable economic growth indicators, they have ignored the long-term and stable growth, resulting＇ in a slow rise of the economic growth performance which is measured by total factor productivity. Based on the 2002-2013 inter-provincial panel data of China, this research attempts to investigate the role of state audit governance in improving regional economic growth performance from the perspective of improving the government efficiency and optimizing official incentive mechanism. The research shows that the stronger the promotion incentive, the worse the regional economic growth performance measured by total factor productivity, and the state audit governance has significantly inhibited the negative impact of the official promotion incentive on economic growth performance. State auditing plays an important role in improving the performance of economic growth.