中文摘要：

文章通过建立民办养老机构与政府的博弈模型，探讨政府补贴与民办养老机构定价的关系，以及单县级服务与多层级服务选择问题．分析相关因素变化对政府与民办养老机构所带来的影响：结果表明，民办养老机构选择多层级模式时，应适当拉开服务水平层级差距；养老需求水平较高时，多层级模式优于单层级模式，养老需求水平较低时，单层级模式优于多层级模式；老年人的机构养老服务偏好越大，选择多层级模式对政府及民办养老机构越有利；高服务成本的养老机构宜选择单层级模式，低服务成本的养老机构宜选择多层级模式。

英文摘要：

The paper constructs a game model between government and private pension institutions, to explore the relationship between pricing of private pension institutions and government＇s subsidy, the selection of the single-class service mode or the muhi-class service model, then to analyze the influences of the related factors to government and private pension institutinns. The results show that： the priwte pension institutions should expand the gap of service level appropriately when the multi-class service mode is selected, the multi-class pension service mode is better than the single-class pension service mode when the pension demand level is higher, the single-class pension service mode is better than the multi-class pension service mode when the pension demand level is lower, the government and private pension institutions perform better with the muhi-class pension service mode when service preference of senior people increases, the pension service institutions with higher cost shouht choose single-class pension service mode, while the pension service institutions with lower cost should selec! muhi-class pension service mode.