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中文摘要：
为了解析上市公司治理中大股东侵占与外部投资者监督的博弈过程，在分析外部投资者与大股东不同策略下各自的成本与收益的基础上，应用演化博弈理论研究了双方的博弈关系．博弈分析结果表明：大股东的侵占成本，监督管理层的收益，中小股东诉讼对大股东的罚金等，都会直接影响到博弈结果．外部投资者和大股东两个群体，在三种情况下存在演化稳定策略．大股东控制权与现金流权的分离程度、大股东的股权比例，都显著影响到大股东的策略选择．本文的研究结论也同时表明了大股东控制对公司治理的“激励”与“侵占”效应．
英文摘要：
In order to analyze the game process of large shareholders＇ s expropriation and the external supervisors of listed company, the evolutionary game theory is used to study the relationship between them based on analyzing their costs and benefits under their different strategies. Results show that the costs of large shareholders＇ s expropriation, benefits from supervising managers and the pun- ishment from suit can affect the results of the game. For external supervisor and large shareholders, there are three evolutionary stable strategy cases. The separation degree of large shareholders＇ s con- trol rights and cash flow rights and the proportion of the ownership will affect shareholders＇ s strategies selection significantly. This paper also testifies the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholders＇ s control on corporate governance.
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