中文摘要：

针对我国生鲜农产品销地批发市场内普遍存在的产品价格信息不对称现象，基于博弈论方法建立了销地批发市场运营商与批发商之间的主从博弈模型，在批发商完全隐藏、部分隐藏和共享采购价格信息三种情形下，分析了双方的动态博弈过程，并进行了比较．给出一种由销地批发市场运营商主导的协调策略，在该策略中，一个足够强的信号在双方博弈开始时传递给批发商，使其相信共享采购价格信息是最优策略．结果表明，批发商共享采购价格信息，不但提高了批发市场运营商的期望利润，更有助于稳定生鲜农产品的供给，平抑生鲜农产品价格波动．最后通过对相关参数的讨论，从终端消费者的角度，给出了具体的管理建议．

英文摘要：

In China, price information asymmetry generally exists in fresh agricultural wholesale markets in sale places. A Stackelberg game model between the wholesale market operator and wholesalers was estab- lished. The dynamic gaming processes between them were analyzed and compared under three different condi- tions： 1 ） the wholesalers entirely concealed their procurement price information, 2） they partially concealed the information, 3 ） and they entirely shared the information. A coordination policy dominated by the market operator was designed. In this policy, a sufficiently strong signal is delivered to wholesalers at the beginning of the planning period, to ensure that sharing procurement price information is the optimal policy. The results show that sharing procurement price information can help the operator achieve more expected profit and do well in stabilizing supply of fresh agricultural products and reining price fluctuation. Ultimately, from the perspec- tive of the end customers, practical management suggestions were proposed by discussing certain parameters.