欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
本文考察了德国监事会制度生成及演进的路径。在外部环境的复杂性与不确定性不断增强的情况下，公司的经营权逐渐转移到董事会手中。为了在经营中维护投资者的利益，监事会作为一种监督制衡机制得以产生。在德国监事会制度变迁过程中，依存一定的历史路径，不同的利益主体通过不断的博弈，最终由国家主导，在监事会中确立了劳资双方代表人数均等以及银行代表、独立监事共同参与的机制，实现了监事会从机能到结构的创新发展。根据德国监事会制度演进的经验，本文提出了我国监事会制度建设的政策建议。
英文摘要：
This paper reviews the evolution of supervisory system in Germany. At the context of increasing complexity and uncertainty of external environment, management right gradually shifts to the boards. Supervisory board arises as a regulatory balance system to protect investor interest in business operation. In the course of history, this system evolves. As a result of equilibrium between various interested parties, the State eventually assumes the control, with equal number in the board representing employers and employees, involved also by bankers and independent supervisors. This marks an innovation of the supervisory board system in terms of function and structure. Based on the German experience, the author puts forward policy suggestion regarding supervisory board system in China.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Building Core Competencies in a Turbulent Environment: An Exploratory Study of Firm Resources and Ca
Oversea Listing, Voluntary Governance and Corporate Performance--A Case Study Based on the ‘Sinopec’
A study of fairness judgments in China, Switzerland and Canada: Do culture, being a student, and gen
期刊信息
位置：