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国家治理的博弈论研究途径与理论洞见
  • ISSN号:1006-0863
  • 期刊名称:《中国行政管理》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:D035[政治法律—政治学]
  • 作者机构:北京师范大学政府管理学院,北京100875
  • 相关基金:国家社科基金项目“合作行为的博弈论与计算模拟研究”(编号:13AZD093);中央高校基础研究基金项目“国家治理体系现代化研究”(编号:201315)
中文摘要:

国家治理体系是多个体复杂互动形成的、具有不同性质与特征的、众多局部公共治理博弈及其均衡构成的复杂嵌套体系。公共治理博弈的不同嵌套关系导致公共治理的全局博弈与局部博弈间呈现错综复杂的关系,因而形成大量作为治理机制的性质不同于全局均衡的局部均衡。任何稳定的博弈均衡都具有自我实施性与自我强化性,因而能够有效发挥协调功能与提高治理能力。国家治理体系现代化是个体间互动形成的公共治理博弈的间断一均衡过程。实现国家治理体系与能力现代化,必须首先通过完善国家治理体系的适度弱耦合结构,改变博弈参与人的个性特征、互动结构与行为选择,形成具有自我实施性与自我强化性的、动员与治理能力更强的国家治理体系,逐步实现国家治理体系与能力的现代化。

英文摘要:

The complexity of state governance modernization entails it is necessary to adopt more kinds of perspectives to investigate so as to grasp the essence of the problems. The perspective of the game theory, based on micro individual behaviors, takes the complex interactions among multi-agents as observing units and breaks down the problems of state governance modernization by focusing on agent' s characteristics, interaction processes and individual choices of behaviors. The main results include that : any state governance is a complex embedded system of a welter of local games and its equilibrium is formed by multi-agents interactions and has variegated natures and characteristics; the embedded varieties of public governance games result in the differences among global and local games and such variegations equilibriate with many kinds of property ; game equilibrium possesses the property of self-enforcing and self-reinforcing which means that the equilibrium, as a coordinating mechanism, will enhance its coordinating and governing capacity largely; and modernization of state governance is the transformation of equilibrium, or the punctuated equilibrium of public governance games. It is necessary for modernization of state governance and governability to modify its individual' s characteristics, interaction processes and individual' s strategy choices, so as to form the equilibrium system of public governance games and to drive the governance and governability towards modernization step by step.

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期刊信息
  • 《中国行政管理》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:国务院办公厅
  • 主办单位:中国行政管理学会
  • 主编:鲍静
  • 地址:北京西安门大街22号北京中南海1745信箱
  • 邮编:100017
  • 邮箱:cpa20086@sohu.com
  • 电话:010-63099125 63093464
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1006-0863
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:11-1145/D
  • 邮发代号:82-447
  • 获奖情况:
  • 全国中文核心期刊,管理学类第一位,中国政治类第三位
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2004版),中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版),中国社科基金资助期刊,中国国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库,中国北大核心期刊(2000版)
  • 被引量:35457