中文摘要：

在这篇论文，在采购的优秀评估水平决定问题的问题在不同信息背景下面被学习。基于斯坦利的优秀收缩优化模型；其它，担心质量的一个主要代理人模型预防水平；评估水平作为主要关于买主被建立；供应商是代理人。在模型，优秀预防水平是供应商决定的一个变量，优秀评估水平；转移支付是买主决定的变量。我们集中于优秀评估水平的学习；在在不对称的信息下面采购转移支付决定。当供应商质量预防水平信息被隐藏时，最大的原则被用来得到答案到优秀评估水平。最后，模拟计算被执行与拖拉机生产采购使一个农业机器公司的生意担心了。在不同信息背景下面的模拟结果被分析；比较。

英文摘要：

In this paper, the issue of quality evaluation level decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information backgrounds. Based on the quality contracting optimization models of Stanley and others, a principal agent model concerned with quality prevention level and evaluation level is set up with regards to buyer as principal and supplier as agent. In the models, quality prevention level is a variable decided by the supplier, quality evaluation level and transfer payment are variables decided by the buyer. We focus on the study of quality evaluation level and transfer payment decision in outsourcing under asymmetric information. Maximal principle is used to get the solution to quality evaluation level when supplier quality prevention level information is hidden. At last simulation calculation is performed concerned with tractor production outsourcing business of an agricultural machine company. Simulation results under different information backgrounds are analyzed and compared.