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中文摘要：
为了探索企业间研发投入差异的原因，结合资源依赖理论和代理理论，研究了董事会人力资本、CEO权力对企业研发投入的影响。以2007--2009年沪深两市高科技上市公司为样本进行实证分析，回归结果显示，董事会人力资本深度与企业研发投入正相关，较大的CEO权力负向调节这种关系；董事会人力资本广度对企业研发投入没有显著影响。研究结果表明，董事会人力资本深度和CEO权力的交互影响是导致企业间研发投入差异的一个重要原因。
英文摘要：
In order to find the reason why R＆D investments differ in different firms, this paper investigates the effect of board human capital and CEO power on R＆D investment with an integrated agency-resource dependence view. Through the empirical analysis with the samples of listed high-tech firms in China A-share from 2007 to 2009, the regression results show that the depth of board human capital is positively related with R＆D invest- ment and high CEO power moderates this relationship negatively. However, no significant effect is found between the breath of board human capital and R＆D investment. The results suggest that the interactive effect of depth of board human capital and CEO power is one of the reasons why R＆D investments differ in different firms. The practical implications for board human resource configuration and CEO selection are discussed in the end.
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