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中文摘要：
本文从项目拍卖者的角度，对交通BOT项目进行特许经营权机制设计，设计了一套科学合理的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率。我们运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型，在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利，通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制；鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性，我们给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式。
英文摘要：
A franchise bidding mechanism is designed for traffic BOT project from the view of the regulator. The main purpose of this paper is to design a set of bidding mechanism scientifically and reasonably to improve the allocative efficiency of franchise bidding. The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism, which is to maximize the expected social welfare on the condition of participation and truly displaying the managing ability of the companies. Then, the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model. Furthermore, we implement the optimal outcome by first-score sealed-bid and supply contract auction.
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