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基于博弈论的高铁货运与航空货运的竞争性分析
  • ISSN号:1001-828X
  • 期刊名称:《现代经济信息》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F532[经济管理—产业经济] F562[经济管理—产业经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都610031, [2]西南交通大学综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,成都610031
  • 相关基金:国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL003);四川省教育厅自然科学项目(15ZB0477).
中文摘要:

在博弈论理论的基础上,通过承运人、托运入和政府三方博弈,从经济性、迅速性、服务性和社会性四个方面建立了高铁货运和航空货运的竞争性模型。通过高铁货运与航空货运的竞争性分析,得出当日达大幅度降低首重价会造成恶性竞争,次晨达首重价可略微上调;合理减少运输时间,使承运人利润增加;提高服务性,长期内可使一方承运人利润有所回升,且对另一方承运人影响较小。政府应根据排放量的减少增加补贴,激励承运人改进硬件设备和燃料技术。基于博弈论在竞争关系下分析不同策略对高铁货运与航空货运的影响,为避免承运人间恶性竞争和政府调控市场提供参考建议。

英文摘要:

Based on game theory, conisidering the game playing of the carrier, the shipper and the government and from four aspects of economy, speed, service and sociality, we established the competition model of the high- speed rail cargo and air cargo transportation. Combining with the competition analysis, it can be concluded that the greatly reduce of the same-day-arrival first heavy freight will cause the vicious competition; the slightly increase of the next-morning-arrival first heavy freight can increase the carder's profits; reasonable reduce of the transportation time can increase the carrier's profits; service's improvement can make one carrier's profits recover, and with little effect to the other carrier in the long period of time. Increasing subsidies should provide by the government based on the reduce of emission to encourage the carrier to improve hardware equipment and fuel technology. In this paper, it also be analyzed the influence of different strategies of high-speed rail cargo and air cargo transportation under the competition relationship based on game theory, and provide advice to avoid vicious competition of the carriers and for the government to regulate the market.

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期刊信息
  • 《现代经济信息:新智囊》
  • 主管单位:
  • 主办单位:黑龙江省经济委员会 黑龙江省企业管理协会
  • 主编:冯宗智
  • 地址:北京市朝阳区酒仙桥路2号格兰维森商务楼301室北京今智囊传媒文化发展有限公司
  • 邮编:100015
  • 邮箱:postmaster@thinktank.net.cn
  • 电话:010-51305611/12/13
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1001-828X
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:23-1056/F
  • 邮发代号:
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 被引量:4