中文摘要：

以2010年-2012年沪深交易所A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,考察管理层持股对公司外部审计需求的影响,以及这种影响在不同产权性质下的差异。结果表明：整体来看,管理层持股有助于缓解经理人与股东之间的代理冲突,一定程度上降低公司的代理成本,进而降低公司对外部高质量审计需求的意愿;相比国有控股公司,管理层持股这种制度安排在民营控股上市公司发挥的作用更为明显,表征出公司对外部高质量的审计需求动机减弱,而在国有控股上市公司中治理作用非常有限。

英文摘要：

By analyzing the data of the listed companies in China from 2007 to 2012, this study examines the relationship between management ownership and external auditing demand. It makes the following conclusions： first, management ownership can stimulate the competition consciousness and creativity, help to contain the agency problem between management and shareholders, and reduce the desire for high quality external auditing. Second, the ultimate control right can moderate the relation between management ownership and external auditing demand. Compared to state-owned firms, th ship and external auditing demand is weakened in state-owned firms.