当不对称跨区域污染存在的情况下,排污权交易将无法实现效用最大化.本文利用效用模型并借助Nash均衡条件研究了中央政府对初始排污权进行分配的前提下,通过设置地方贸易禁令和排污税对排污权交易系统进行干预的情况.结果表明只有不设置贸易禁令地区的初始排污权分配才能实现一阶最优.
A system of tradable permits may be failure when asymmetric transboundary pollution exists.By using optimization model and Nash equilibrium theory,we explore the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system by arranging emission taxes through the initial allocation of permits.It shows that the allocation of permits generating the first-best outcome will be one where territories do not impose trade bans.