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中文摘要：
通过构造一个2级供应链,建立了垄断供应商和制造商在非合作状态下的博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法求出了垄断供应商和制造商的非合作均衡解,并证明了垄断供应商优先选择生产成本低的制造商作为谈判对象。同时,提出了制造商之间的技术实力差距对非合作均衡态的影响,如果2个制造商之间的技术实力相差悬殊,市场将出现比较稳定的非合作均衡现象,如果技术实力接近,将出现争夺谈判权的博弈现象。
英文摘要：
We set up a two-stage supply chain and raise the negotiation game models between monopoly supplier and manufacturers under non-cooperation state.By backward induction method,we solve the equilibrium solutions of monopoly supplier and manufacturers.We prove that monopoly supplier prefer to choose manufacturers with low production cost to negotiates with.Meanwhile,we also analyze the influence of manufacturers＇ technical efficiency difference on non-cooperation equilibrium state.If the technical efficiency difference of two manufacturers is disparate,the market will appear the stable non-cooperation equilibrium state.If the technical efficiency difference is close,manufacturers will contest the right of negotiation with monopoly supplier in the short-term.
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