中文摘要：

借鉴Gervais和Daniel等人提出的过度自信表示方法，在假设公司股东风险中性、经理风险厌恶且过度自信的条件下，利用一个简单的两期资本预算决策过程模型和实物期权方法，建立恰当的数学模型研究上市公司经理的过度自信心理偏好对其股票补偿的影响．研究结果表明，使公司价值最大化的股票补偿数量将随着经理过度自信程度的提高而减少；在一定条件下，使公司股东收益最大化的股票补偿数量也将随着经理过度自信程度的增大而减少；在使股东收益最大化的最优股票补偿合同中，过度自信经理要求得到的股票补偿数量一定少于理性经理所要求得到的股票补偿数量；使公司价值最大化的股票补偿数量大于使股东收益最大化的股票补偿数量．

英文摘要：

Using the expressing methods of overconfidence provided by Gervais and Daniel etc. for reference, under the hypotheses condition that the stockholders are risk neutral and the manager is risk aversion and overconfident, making use of a simple two-period capital budgeting decision model and real option method, this paper studies the effect of the manager＇s overconfident psychological preference on his stock compensation by setting up an appropriate mathematical model. The results show that the stock compensation amount maximized the firm value are decreased in the manager＇s overconfident level; and under the certain conditions, the stock compensation amount maximized the stockholder＇s return are decreased in the manager＇s overconfident level too; and in the optimal compensation contracts, the stock compensation amount required by the overconfident manager is bound to be less than that required by the rational manager; and the stock compensation amount maximized the firm value are greater than that amount maximized the stockholder＇s return.