中文摘要：

通过分析水电工程建设的多任务关系，利用委托代理理论构建了水电投资企业和水电施工企业的安全行为决策模型。根据水电投资企业是否确定施工企业风险规避度，分别讨论了水电投资企业和施工企业的Stackelberg博弈最优安全行为策略。研究结果表明，水电投资企业安全任务激励报酬与施工企业在安全任务上的努力水平会随着努力绩效系数估计的增大而增大。当水电投资企业不确定施工企业的风险规避度时，会造成预期收益的下降。特别地，当风险规避度服从均匀分布时，水电投资企业激励报酬和预期收益的“预测失真”随着对风险规避度估计偏差的增加而加剧。最后通过算例验证了结论的有效性。

英文摘要：

This paper develops a safety behavior decision model for the investment enterprise and construction enterprise of hydropower engineering using multi-task principal-agent theory, and discusses the Stackelberg game strategies for the optimal safety behaviors of these enterprises in view of uncertain risk aversion. The results show that the incentive pay of safety task in the investment enterprise and the effort level of safety task in the construction enterprise are directly proportional to observable variables variance. The expected revenue of investment enterprise declines if it cannot set the risk aversion degree of construction enterprise. Particularly, in the case of uniform distribution of risk aversion, the prediction distortions of incentive pays and expected revenue become more serious as a result of more deviation in the risk aversion estimate. A case study is presented to demonstrate the results.