中文摘要：

作为董事会中最重要的两个专门委员会，审计委员会与薪酬委员会委员交叠任职是上市公司频繁发生却被学术界忽视的现象，本文检验了交叠任职这种董事内部兼任网络对盈余管理以及经理人机会主义薪酬的影响。结果发现：审计委员会与薪酬委员会的职位交叠程度越高，公司盈余管理越严重；在经理人薪酬水平较高或内部薪酬差距较高的公司中，两个专业委员会的交叠任职与盈余管理的正相关性更强，经理人“薪酬一操纵性盈余”敏感性也更高，结果表明经理人可能与交叉任职的董事合谋来操纵会计盈余质量，进而攫取更高的机会主义薪酬，而且当经理人对薪酬的辩护需求较强时合谋的动机更强。结论表明专门委员会的交叠任职所组成的董事内部网络可能是盈余质量降低和经理人机会薪酬的重要因素。

英文摘要：

The overlapping of audit committee and compensation committee generates directors＇ internal network. This paper is to examine the influence of the overlapping on earnings management and the managers＇ opportunism compensation. The results showed that the higher overlapping degree and the higher pay-managed performance sensitivity of CEOs salaries. , the higher level of earnings management, Further, we find that in the companies where CEOs＇ salaries or internal pay gap is higher, The relation between overlapping degree of the two committees and earnings management is stronger, and the pay-managed performance sensitivity is higher. The results indicate that committee overlapping network may be one of determinants of earnings quality and CEOs＇ pay.