基于高技术企业数据,研究了管理团队中的核心高管薪酬地位对企业资本投入的影响。结果表明,核心高管薪酬地位越高,则资本投入越少。分位数回归表明,核心高管薪酬地位与资本投入的关系随资本投入规模的不同而呈动态变化。调节效应检验表明,在国有控股企业或大股东控制力强的企业中,核心高管薪酬地位对资本投入的影响较弱,而在非国有控股企业或大股东控制力弱的企业中,核心高管薪酬地位对资本投入的影响较强。
Based on high technology industry data,the influence of key executives'compensation status in management team on capital investment is explored.The result shows that,the higher the key executives compensation status,the less the capital investment.Quantile regression shows that,the relation of key executives'compensation status and capital investment changes with different investment scale dynamically.Moderating effect test shows that,in state-holding enterprises or enterprises with strong control force of big shareholders,the relation of key executives'compensation status and capital investment is weaker,while in non-state-holding enterprises or enterprises with weak control force of big shareholders,the relation is stronger.