中文摘要：

本研究以渠道权力理论为切入点，以国美电器和正阳家电的进场费实践为例．对渠道权力结构与进场费之间的作用关系进行了初步的实证研究，研究表明：在零售商处于权力优势的渠道中，零售商的权力优势越显著，进场费额度越高；在制造商处于权力优势的渠道中，不存在进场费；权力高度均衡的渠道中，存在进场费，但额度较低。此外，进场费也可通过影响渠道绩效而间接地作用于满意度，进而影响渠道关系稳定性。

英文摘要：

Based on channel power theories, the authors take Gome and the Zhengyang Electronic Appliances Company as samples to conduct an empirical study of the relationships between channel power structure and slotting allowances. It is found that if retailers are in power advantage in a channel of asymmetrical power structure, the more advantageous, the higher slotting allowances; on the contrary, if manufactures are in power advantage, slotting allowances don＇t exist. Moreover, in a channel of symmetrical power structure, in which retailers and manufactures highly depend on each other, slotting allowances are the lowest. At last, slotting allowances also have an indirect effect on the stability of channel relations by influencing the conducts of channel performance and satisfaction.