本文通过构建理论模型和实证检验全面分析了证券分析师所面临的利益关系对其所发布的信息质量的影响,结果表明:证券分析师为了维护与基金等机构投资者以及公司内部投资银行部门的关系,倾向于发布偏乐观的盈余预测和股票评级;声誉较高的分析师也同样不能在各种利益关系的漩涡中保持独立。这些结果揭示了我国证券分析师独立性缺失的利益根源,并为监管层规范和发展证券分析师行业提供了重要的理论依据。
This paper examines whether the conflicts of interest affect analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations in China. We find the incentive of cultivating the rela- tionship with institutional investors and investment banking department encourages analyststo report optimistically biased earnings forecasts and stock recommendation. We also find the analysts with higher reputation are not inclined to report credibly, their recommendations are even more positively biased although they report relatively conservative earnings forecasts.