中文摘要：

从CEO 职业生涯关注视角，选取2007—2014 年我国沪深A 股上市公司为样本，实证检验CEO 预期任期对盈余管理行为的影响。结果发现：CEO 预期任期与公司应计和真实盈余管理行为呈负相关关系，说明长的预期任期在某种程度上能抑制公司的盈余管理行为。进一步研究发现，上述结论在非面临换届的样本组中成立，而面临换届压力的样本组中CEO 的预期任期不能抑制应计盈余管理行为；当CEO 为新任职时，预期任期也不能抑制应计盈余管理行为；对于已过退休年龄的CEO 而言，预期任期对应计盈余和真实盈余管理行为均不具有影响关系。

英文摘要：

By taking the perspective of CEO’s career concerns, the present study selects samples from Chinese listedcompanies from 2007 to 2014 to undertake an empirical test on the impact of CEOs’ expected tenure on earningsmanagement behavior. It is found that the longer the CEO’s expected tenure, the less accrual earnings management andreal earnings management of listed companies, which illustrates that longer expected tenure can suppress, to a certainextent, the earnings management in the company. Further study shows that this relationship is also significant in thegroup without transition pressure. For the group with transition pressure, CEO’s expected tenure does not inhibit accrualearnings management. Besides, this relationship is the same for the new CEO. However, for some CEOs who are overretirement age, expected tenure does not inhibit accrual earnings management and real earnings management.