当企业通过技术创新降低产品成本时,产品定价具有内生基础。针对这一特点,将传统Hote lling模型中外生的定价策略作为内生变量,研究了技术溢出王件下的三阶段R&D/产品问题:双寡头企业先决定R&D投入水平,然后对单一定价策略或歧视定价策略进行战略选择,最后在产品市场中进行价格竞争。研究发现,歧视定价是企业获得超额利润的占优策略。当市场中只有一个企业实施歧视定价时,其研发动力最强;当竞争对手同时实施歧视定价时,则该企业表现出明显的"创新惰性",研发动力减弱。在均衡定价策略下,企业利润与技术溢出水平存在正相关关系,并且适度的技术溢出有利于社会福利的增加,而过度的技术溢出将导致社会福利降低。
Pricing strategy choice can be endogenous when firms reduce product costs by technology innovation. In response to this feature, product pricing strategy is regarded as an endogenous variable in a three-stages R&D/product model with technology spillovers, in which firms decide their R&D investment, and then choose pricing strategies between uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing, in the end they sustain price competition in product market. As a result, discriminatory pricing is the dominant strategy for each firm. When only one firm implements discriminatory pricing, its R&D motivation is the most intensive, when its competitor implement discriminatory pricing simultaneously, it will embody " innovation inertia" and its R&D motivation becomes weak. Under equilibrium strategy, there is a positive correlation between firms' profits and technology spillovers, and social welfare will increase with an appropriate degree of technology spillovers, but decrease with excessive technology spillovers.