本文旨在考察地方官员能力对其发展绩效的影响。基于中国1978—2008年间的省级跨地交流官员样本,本文从经济总量、产业发展、总需求和收入分配四个维度,定量识别每个地方官员的发展绩效,发现地方官员在每个维度上的发展绩效都存在差异;这种绩效差异在很大程度上源于地方官员的能力。本文的发现揭示了,面临相同的激励,不同能力的地方官员的发展绩效也会存在差异,从而优化地方官员配置也将是促进区域经济协调发展的有效途径。
This paper aims to explore local officials' competence of developing performance. Based on Chinese provincial officials data between 1978 and 2008, this paper identifies each official's development performance quantitatively from the dimensions of total economy, industrial development, aggregate demand and income distribution, and finds that local officials' development performance differentiates in each development dimension. This performance is largely due to differences in the competence of local officials. Our findings reveal that facing the same incentives, local officials' development performance will be different because of different competences. It means optimizing local officials allocation is an effective way to promote coordinated regional economic development.