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中文摘要：
研究全支付拍卖模型中参与人的参与结构以及均衡问题．首先给出了非对称信息下参与人的参与选择问题，分析了异质参与人的参与选择．尔后给出了参与人参与均衡策略，给出当参与人估价分布函数在对称和非对称情形时，竞赛中的对称均衡策略．最后给出了当均衡存在时，竞争对手对均衡分布函数的估计．
英文摘要：
All pay auction are situations in which players spend bids in order to win the contest. This paper characterize the all pay auction architecture and the equilibrium for the auction. First we give each player＇s expenditure distributed function when facing different player. Player use cutoff strategies to decide whether they will participate in the all pay auction. Then we give the equilibrium when player are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Finally, when the equilibrium exists, from the point of competitor, we give the the equilibrium distribution estimates.
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