中文摘要：

文章构建了高校图书馆占座行为的博弈分析模型，从经典博弈和演化博弈的角度，解释占座现象形成的过程和均衡结果。研究显示，在不同情况下，（占座，占座）、（不占座，不占座）、（占座，不占座）都有可能是博弈的均衡结果。随着支付参数和学生学习行为的变化，均衡不断迁移和稳定。这一研究结果说明在座位资源稀缺时占座现象有其必然性，强行取缔需要监督者支付高昂的成本。文章还讨论了一种降低监督成本的方法微信计时法，作为解决占座问题的措施．

英文摘要：

This paper established a static game model of occupation of seats, and described the process of the occupation behavior and the equilibrium results from the perspective of classic game theory and evo lutionary game theory, explained that （0,0）, （NO, NO） and （0, NO） can all be the equilibrium results in different situations. That is, equilibrium will shift and stabilize with change of payoff parameters and shift of students＇ learning behavior. This analysis showed that the formation of the institution of occupation was inevitable and reasonable if resources are scarce. The management had to pay high cost to eliminate this in- stitution. The paper also introduced one plausible measurement to improve the institution of occupation-- Timing by WeChat.