中文摘要：

本文研究了一个产出不确定的供应商与一个社会计划者组成的两级流感疫苗供应链决策问题，其中社会计划者在分散无契约情形时仅知道随机产量的部分信息，而在集中控制情形时知道随机产量的全部信息。供应商在初始供货时由于生产的不确定性而出现短缺，此时供应商将采用紧急生产方式来弥补短缺量，其中紧急生产成本依赖随机产量。文章在分析了分散无契约与集中控制情形后提出用短缺惩罚与成本分享契约来完美协调流感疫苗供应链。最后给出数值算例，并对主要参数进行灵敏度分析。

英文摘要：

A two level influenza vaccine supply chain consisting of a supplier with yield uncertainty and a social planner is studied , in which the social planner know partial information of random yield in decentralized noncon-tract scenario and know all the information of random yield in centralized control scenario .Owing to shortage in initial supply , the supplier will use the emergency mode of production , which the emergency production cost depends on random yield , to make up for the shortage .After analyzing the model of decentralized noncontract scenario and centralized control scenario , the shortage penalty and cost sharing contract , which can perfect coor-dinate the influenza vaccine supply chain , is proposed.Finally, the numerical examples and the sensitivity anal-ysis of main parameters are provided .