欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
报酬契约是所有者激励经营者努力工作的基本方法,其传统做法是将经营者报酬与企业业绩进行直接挂钩,而企业业绩产出本身具有多源性特点——除来自经营者的个人努力外,还与行业结构、资源特征与经营者能力等显著相关。基于上述观点,本文引入了横纵向两维度的相对业绩与经营者能力变量,重构报酬契约模型,并运用委托代理理论进行约束条件下的求解,分析出的结论对企业集团完善报酬契约的设计具有现实借鉴意义。
英文摘要：
The compensation contract is always used by owner as an essential method for motivating operator to work hard,and its traditional pattern is tying operator’s pay with enterprise performance directly.However,the enterprise performance itselfs is polygenetic-not only depending on operators’ efforts,but also significantly correlating with industry structure,the characteristics of resources and ability of operators.Based on this view,this paper intoduces relative performance in vertical and horizontal dimension as well as ability of operator,then reconstructs the compensation contract’s model,and finds a solution in the constraints of the principal-agent theory.The final conclusion has important practical significance for the enterprise group to design a more appropriate compensation contract.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Measuring and decomposing efficiency in international tourist hotels in Taipei using a multi-divisio
A Modified Super-efficiency DEA Approach for Solving Multi-groups Multi-outputs Classification Probl
A DEA Model for Efficiency Evaluation with Undesirable Output: An Application of Paper Mills along H
An Integrated Pricing and Deteriorating Model for a VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) supply chain with
“DEA Studies on Comprehensive Efficiency of Output Allocation with an Application to Paper Mills alo
Ontology of collaborative manufacturing: Alignment of service-oriented framework with service-domina
Performances Based Clustering for Benchmarking of Container Ports: An Application of DEA and Cluster
new Malmquist productivity index based on semi-discretionary variables with an application to commer
位置：