轻量级分组密码算法PRESENT由于其出色的硬件实现性能和简洁的轮函数设计,一经提出便引起了工业界与学术界的广泛关注.文中作者基于Biclique分析方法,首次提出针对21轮PRESENT-80算法的Biclique密钥恢复攻击方法.该攻击方法需要2^78.9的计算复杂度和2^64的数据复杂度.此外,针对PRESENT-80的Biclique攻击也可推广到相同轮数的PRESENT-128和DM-PRESENT压缩函数的安全性分析.与其它已公开密码学安全性分析结果相比,作者提出的Biclique攻击在内存复杂度上具有一定的优势.
Due to its excellent hardware performance and elegant design, the ilgntweight cipher PRESENT attracts widely attention from both industry and academy society. In this paper, we present a new Biclique cryptanalysis on 21-round PRESENT, which can recover secret key with 2^78.9 time complexity and 2^64 chosen ciphertexts. Moreover, our Biclique attack can be extended to PRESENT-128 and the compression function of DM-PRESENT with the same rounds. Compared with the published results, our new Biclique analysis has the advantage on its memory complexity.