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中文摘要：
基于对余额宝、银行、监管机构三方的博弈分析,从数理上阐明了余额宝促进存款利率市场化的鲇鱼效应,即余额宝节约了交易费用,降低了投资门槛,吸引了大量＂存款搬家＂;而银行的被动应对会提高自身的融资成本并推高社会的融资成本,必须主动推进存款利率市场化来提高社会福利;监管机构需要对余额宝适度监管,为金融创新留下空间。
英文摘要：
Through the analysis of the triple game between Yu＇ebao, banks and the regulators, this paper illustrates in theory the catfish effect of Yu＇ebao in the promotion of deposit interest rate marketization, i.e., Yu＇ ebao can save transaction cost, lower the investment threshold, and attract a large number of depositors to shift their savings accounts. However, the passive response of the banks will increase their financing cost and drive up the social financing cost, thus it is critical to take the initiative response to advance deposit interest rate marketization, so as to improve the social welfare. The regulators have to exercise appropriate supervising on Yu＇ ebao, leaving space for financial innovation.
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