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中文摘要：
摘要：利用演化博弈方法研究了处于成熟期和扩张期的创业企业融资策略选择（指在股权融资和债权融资间选择）的演化过程，建立投融资双方模式选择的演化博弈模型，分析投融资双方在股权模式和债权模式两种策略下的选择行为，根据复制动态方程得到了双方投融资模式选择的演化规律，分析给出各种情况下的演化稳定策略，并提出了达到稳态投融资模式发展路径的相应建议。
英文摘要：
An evolution process is studied of business enterprise financing strategy selection （the selection between equity financing and debt financing） in mature period and the expansion, by the evolutionary game method. The evolutionary game model is established on both sides of investment and financing mode selection. And the selection behavior of both the equity investment and financing mode is analyzed under the two strategies of equity and debt. Then the evolution law of investment and financing mode selection is obtained according to the replicated dynamic equation, evolutionary stable strategy is analyzed of various cases, and the corresponding suggestions are put for- ward in the development path of steady-state investment and financing mode.
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