中文摘要：

公司治理问题产生根源是由于委托代理关系而引致的代理问题，而代理问题的实质则是信息不对称性，已有的理论研究表明。企业跨境交叉上市相当于为公司治理引进了一个新的外部治理机制，有利于提升公司信息披露质量。然而，限于大多数中国企业采用“先外后内”的特殊交叉上市路径，其对公司治理的影响则要复杂的多。本文采用分析师盈余预测准确度作为衡量信息披露质量代理变量，首先利用2008年至2013年我国先H股后A股交叉上市企业数据。对跨境交叉上市行为对公司治理水平的影响进行了考察，研究表明：尽管横向对比上看．交叉上市公司的信息披露质量优于非交叉上市的纯A股公司，但这主要是由自选择问题造成的，而非交叉上市所引起的改善。因为进一步的检验发现，在纵向上的交叉上市后其企业的信息披露质量并未提高，反而出现了下降。其次，我们进一步对“先内后外”交叉上市进行检验发现，该上市路径则有助于公司治理的改善。本文的研究结论表明，不同的交叉上市路径对公司治理会带来不同的影响，而“海归股”重返内地交叉上市主要基于融资动机，而非公司治理改善之目的，这一点应引起监管部门的重视。

英文摘要：

The root cause of corporate governance is agency problem arising from delegations. The key point of agent problem is information asymmetric. Based on the theoretical research, as an effective external mechanism on corporate governance, cross-listing is beneficial to information quality. However the special ＂Fist H after A＂ cross-listing path which most Chinese companies chose has more complex influence on its corporate governance. We apply earning forecast accuracy to measure the quality of information disclosure. Firstly, we use data of China＇ s ＂ H ＋ A＂ cross-listed companies from 2008 to 2013 to investigate the effect of Cross-listing Behavior on Corporate Governance. Our results show that even though the information quality of cross-listed companies is superior to which of the non-cross-listed peers,self-selection appears to be the main reason rather than the improvement coming from Cross-listing Behavior. And longitudinal comparative analysis show that information quality declined after those companies listed abroad. Moreover we examine data of companies with ＂A ＋ H＂ dual Listing and find that this ＂A ＋ H＂ cross-listing path contributes to improving the corporate governance. Hence our results conclude that different cr0ss-listing path results to distinguish impact on corporate governance. Regulatory authorities should pay attention to the fact that the motivation of ＂H ＋ A＂ cross-listing behavior is financing other than improvement of corporate governance.