董事之重要,在于他们是制定和监督企业战略的商业精英,企业竞争优势的培育和利益相关者价值的最大化都离不开一个精英董事会。特别是,具有多家董事席位,我们称作连锁董事的人,对企业的战略制定具有特殊的作用。根植于西方发达国家的连锁董事研究已近一个世纪。连锁董事使得企业嵌入于一个有关商业知识和实践的传播体制,其中,具有更多的连锁董事的企业更容易产生创新、发生战略模仿、建立企业间联盟以及促进企业对外部资源的获取。今天,在中国转型经济条件下,连锁董事现象也非常普及,企业之间因为连锁董事而形成了一个紧密的商业网络,连锁董事通过影响和塑造企业的战略选择而影响整个经济系统。因为转型经济的特点,连锁董事对企业战略的影响也势必受到来自于不同层面的边界条件的约束,相关问题研究在转型经济条件下也变得越来越重要。
When we look at the board of directors in the listed companies, we surprisingly find that a board of director can sit on maltiple board seats of corporations. These multiple directors are important, because they are the business elites who formulate and monitor firm strategic decisions, and firm competitive advantages and the maximization of stakeholder values are contingent on these director roles. These arguments have already been proved by the voluminous studies in the western countries. Specifically, those multiple directors as called interlocking directorates have significant impact on corporate strategies. Nearly one century research on interlocking directorates has found that interlocking directorates make firms embedded within a contagious network consisting important business knowledge and practices. Those who have more interlocking directorates are more likely to innovate, im- itate others, form interfirm alliances, and help firm seeking essential resources. Today, the interlocking directorate has become a prevalent phenomenon in China' s transition economy. Public - listed firms have formed a cohesive interlock network via interlocking directorates. Under this condition, interlocking directorates may exert important influence on firm strategy which may help shape the performance of the whole economic system. However, because of the uniqueness of institutional transitions, the effect of interlocking directorates on firm strategy will be contingent on different boundary conditions rooted in the transitional context.