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不完全信息环境下的企业价格竞争研究
  • ISSN号:2095-6533
  • 期刊名称:《西安邮电大学学报》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:O225[理学—运筹学与控制论;理学—数学]
  • 作者机构:[1]长沙理工大学,长沙410114
  • 相关基金:教育部人文社科基金资助项目(12YJCZH226); 西安邮电学院中青年基金资助项目(1040403;1040401)
中文摘要:

在经典价格竞争模型-伯川德模型的基础上,采用演化博弈理论和方法研究不完全信息条件下企业价格竞争的发生机理。结果表明:产品消费者价格敏感度、企业降价幅度及降价企业的类型都约束着激烈价格竞争的发生;较多企业在不进行价格合谋的条件下,可以自发演化为价格不变,从而从不完全信息的角度解决了伯川德悖论,揭示了企业价格竞争的内在机理。

英文摘要:

It Was designed an experiment on semi-rigid horizontal force joints of pulley-dip supporting frame through three groups of specimens. By the analysis of experimental phenomena and data as well as the comparisons with joints rigidity of steel tubular scaffolding, following conclusions were obtained : the joints of pulley-clip supporting frame are typical semi-rigid connections, its semi-rigidity is little affected by the different erection distances; the fluctuation of initial connection stiffness of joints is slightly large, when the joint moment is lower than the 20 percent of the control moment; but with over 20 percent of the control moment, the connection stiffness tends towards to be steady; the connection stiffness of the three groups of specimens is equivalent to that of steel tubular scaffolding with tightening torque of 40 N.m, and the stability and erection quality of pulley-clip supporting frame is better than the traditional steel tubular scaffolding.

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期刊信息
  • 《西安邮电大学学报》
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 主管单位:陕西省教育厅
  • 主办单位:西安邮电大学
  • 主编:温小郑
  • 地址:西安市长安区西安邮电大学南校区
  • 邮编:710121
  • 邮箱:xuebao@xupt.edu.cn
  • 电话:029-88166079
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:2095-6533
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:61-1493/TN
  • 邮发代号:
  • 获奖情况:
  • 2011年荣获工业和信息化部科技期刊(邮电类)编辑...
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国科技核心期刊
  • 被引量:781