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中文摘要：
依据认知神经科学关于道德判断的一系列研究，并援引道德心理学的一些相关研究的结果，加西华·格林（Joshua Greene）试图表明，人们通常做出的符合道义论的道德判断大多是情绪驱动的产物，而符合后果论的道德判断则多是理性推理的结果。格林认为，这种情况对以康德伦理学为代表的理性主义道义论哲学构成了严重的挑战，认知科学关于道德判断的实验研究表明康德伦理学是错误的。然而，虽然格林富有创意的认知神经科学研究对道义论哲学构成了足以引起重视的挑战，但由于他在推理和实验设计中存在重要的疏忽，忽略了人们在他所谓“非切身的”情境下仍然有可能做出符合道义论的道德判断的情况，致使他在推理上犯了以偏概全的逻辑错误。因此，格林对道义论哲学的攻击是不成功的，认知科学尚未表明康德伦理学是错误的。
英文摘要：
Drawing on his experimental studies in cognitive neuroscience on moral judgment, as well as some other empirical studies in moral psychology, Joshua Greene attempts to show that people＇s deontological moral judgments are mostly driven by emotional responses while consequentialist judgments are products of cognitive and reasoning processes. He has thereby made a case against deontological philosophy, especially Kantian ethics. This article is a reply to Greene, showing that his attack on deontological philosophy is unjustified. In his experimental studies and argument as well, Greene neglects the possibility that people＇s deontological judgments can also be un-emotional, and therefore his reasoning against Kantian ethics is flawed. The cognitive science of moral reasoning and judgment has not yet shown that deontological philosophy is false.
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