中文摘要：

从投资决策自主权、产品销售自主权以及人力资源管理自主权三方面构建了大型国企分公司总经理自主权的评价指标,并基于调研数据进行了评价及实证分析。研究表明,在分公司总经理自主权中,人力资源管理自主权相对较好,投资决策自主权最差;分公司总经理自主权对分公司业绩具有显著的促进作用,但当分公司总经理自主权达到一定程度后,对业绩的作用将减弱。与此同时,分公司总经理的投资决策自主权对分公司业绩的影响最大。最后,根据分析中发现的问题提出了强化分公司总经理自主权的具体对策,并指出,由于大型分公司所表现出来的强的＂法人特性＂以及总公司与分公司之间代理问题的存在,总公司在对待分公司的方式上,应该由传统的管理向治理转变,但这又引致＂分公司治理的必要性＂等诸多理论难题。

英文摘要：

This paper constructs the evaluation index system of general managerial discretion for branch companies in large stat-owned enterprises from the following three perspectives： general managerial discretion of investment decision,product sales and human resource management.It also does the evaluation and empirical study based on the data of questionnaire investigation.The result shows that the general managerial discretion of human resource management has reached better level for branch companies in large state-owned enterprises,on the contrast,the general managerial discretion of investment decision is relatively poor;general managerial discretion of branch companies have positive effects on branch companies＇ performance.However,the positive effects will weaken after the general managerial discretion reaches a certain point.At the same time,general managerial discretion of investment decision in branch companies has the most obvious effect on branch companies＇ performance.Finally,it puts forward certain concrete countermeasures to strengthen general managerial discretion according to the problems finding.Besides,this research also indicates that,because branch companies have obvious characters that they are ＂legal person＂ and there are agent problems between general corporations and branch companies,the way by which general corporation treats branch companies should realize the transformation from traditional management to governance.Nevertheless,it will lead to such theoretical puzzles as ＂necessity of governance of branch companies＂.