中文摘要：

以2004年～2005年沪深两市中的企业集团作为研究样本，实证检验企业集团的激励、监督机制对股权代理成本的影响。研究发现，以CEO持股比例和高管层持股比例衡量的股权激励机制对股权代理成本没有显著影响，董事会监督机制中独立董事比例与股权代理成本显著正相关，受薪董事比例与股权代理成本显著负相关，董事会规模、CEO是否兼任董事长与股权代理成本之间不存在显著相关关系。此外，在董事会监督对股权代理成本的影响过程中并未发现股权激励机制的中介作用。

英文摘要：

This paper gives an empirical study of the effect of monitoring, incentives on equity agency cost by using the sample of business groups from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2004 to 2005. The result shows that there is not a significant association between managerial ownership motivations and equity agency cost. The proportion of independent directors is positively and significantly associated with equity agency cost, while the proportion of paid board directors is negatively and significantly associated with equity agency cost. But there is no notable association between board size, the leadership of board and equity agency cost. What is more, we do not find the mediating effect of ownership motivations between board monitoring and equity agency cost.