研究了需求具有价格和时间均敏感条件下两个具有风险规避特性的零售商间价格与交货期竞争决策问题。首先,分析了Bertrand博弈模式下两个风险规避零售商间的价格与交货期决策行为;其次,分析了Stackelberg博弈模式下两个风险规避零售商间的价格与交货期决策行为;最后,通过数值分析发现零售商过度风险规避会导致在竞争中处于劣势,并发现在Stackelberg双寡头博弈下的价格高于Bertrand双寡头博弈下。
"Price/delivery" competition decision-making issue under the demand price and time-sensitive between two risk aversion retailers is studied in this paper. First, "price/delivery" competition decision-making behavior is studied under Bertrand Game model. Then, "price/ delivery" competition decision-making behavior is studied under Stackelberg Game model. Finally,through numerical analysis we get the following conclusions: excessive risk aversion will put retailers at a competitive disadvantage;the prices are higher under Stackelberg duopoly Game than Bertrand duopoly Game.