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中文摘要：
以2006—2009年我国上市公司为研究样本,以操纵性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理程度的代理变量,以高管年薪、持股水平分别作为衡量其短期、长期薪酬水平的代理变量,实证检验了上市公司高管的长、短期薪酬水平及两者的交叉变量与上市公司盈余管理的因果关系。结果显示：高管的短期薪酬是我国上市公司盈余管理的基本诱因之一;高管年薪与持股水平的相互作用也会加强上市公司的盈余管理行为。
英文摘要：
This paper chooses the listed companies during the period from 2006 to 2009 as the research samples.By taking the discretionary accrual as the proxy variable of representing the degree of earning management,and taking the salary and the shareholding ratio as the proxy variable of representing the short-term and long-term compensation level of executives,this paper empirically studies the causal relationship between the long-term and short-term compensation level of executives as well as their cross variable and earning management.The results show as follows：executive′s salary is one of basic inducements for earning management in listed companies;the interaction of executive′s salary with shareholding ratio would also strengthen the earning management behaviors in listed companies.
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