中文摘要：

在产品具有网络外部性、消费者具有不同质量偏好的情况下，通过建立多阶段的技术许可博弈模型，对双寡头市场上在位企业技术许可选择问题进行了研究．研究结论表明：决定最优许可策略的临界网络强度与产品质量差异正相关；从在位企业利润最大化的角度看，最优的技术许可策略只存在于产量提成许可和两部制许可之间，且随着网络强度的增大由产量提成许可转向两部制许可；从社会福利最大化的立场看，最优的许可策略应为固定费许可；针对企业和社会对最优许可策略偏好的不一致，提出通过事前补贴、事后征税以及受许方企业提高自身产品质量等手段来改善社会福利状况．然而论证结果说明，事后征税仅仅使许可方的部分收益转移给了政府，却无法增加消费者剩余以及改善社会福利，而事前补贴和受许方提高自身产品质量等手段虽改善了社会福利，但仍无法达到社会福利最优时的状态．

英文摘要：

It established a multi-stage technology licensing game model with the aim to study the optimal choice of in- cumbent technology licensing in assumptions of product with network externalities and consumers with different quality preferences. The findings show that： firstly, the critical network intensity determining the optimal licensing strategy is increasing with product quality difference ; secondly, aiming for profit maximization of the incumbent, the optimal technology licensing strategy are from outputs royalty licensing to two part tariff licensing with the increase of network effect; thirdly, from the perspective of social welfare maximization, optimal licensing strategy should be the fixed-fee licensing ; fourthly, to solve the above contradictions, it proposed the policies such as subsidies in pre-innovation, taxations in post-licensing for the governments, and the method of product quality improvement for licensee. However, it proved that taxation in post-licensing just transfer ownership of royalty return from the licensor to the government, but cannot increase consumer surplus and improve social welfare. Meanwhile, although subsidies in pre-innovation and product quality improvement can increase social welfare, but still cannot achieve the optimal state of social welfare.