中文摘要：

利用2003-2013年沪深A股上市公司管理层地缘关系紧密程度与投资效率的数据进行实证检验,研究发现：国有企业董事长与总经理间地缘关系较非国有企业更紧密,以地方国有企业更甚;当企业与董事长出生（或成长）地处于同省时,董事长与总经理地缘关系更紧密。董事长与总经理地缘关系越紧密,企业投资效率越低。相比民营企业而言,国有企业高管地缘关系对投资效率影响更明显;相比地方国有企业而言,中央国有企业高管地缘关系对投资效率影响更明显;董事长不在同省的企业高管地缘关系对投资效率影响更明显。

英文摘要：

This paper makes use of the data of the closeness of managerial geographical relation- ship and investment efficiency from A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock ex- changes from 2003 to 2013 to conduct an empirical test. The results indicate that the geographical re- lationship between the chairman of the board and the general manager in state-owned enterprises is closer than that in the non-state-owned ones; this is even so in local state-owned enterprises. If the enterprise is located in the same province where the chairman is born or growing up, the geographi- cal relationship between the chairman and the general manager is much closer. The closer the geo- graphical relationship between the chairman and the general manager is, the less investment efficiency of the enterprise will be. Compared with the private enterprises, the geographical relationship of the management in the state-owned enterprises has a more significant effect on the investment efficiency. Compared with local state-owned enterprises, the geographical relationship of the management in the enterprises owned by the central government has a more significant effect on the investment efficien- cy. And the geographical relationship of the management in the enterprises whose chairman is not in the same province has a more significant effect on the investment efficiency.