中文摘要：

委托代理理论表明,双重委托代理机制下的地方政府和农民共享农村集体建设用地发展权的模式比单一委托代理机制下的地方政府垄断发展权模式具有更高的绩效,主要表现在改进了信息不对称情况下的监督效率以及土地发展权取得环节和建设用地供应环节的竞争。我国农村集体建设用地发展权配置方式正处在从单一委托代理机制下的垄断模式向双重委托代理机制下的共享模式转变。但是,初步建立的发展权共享模式并不完善,需要从农村集体建设用地流转法规完善、土地征收的公共利益界定、信息公开和法规教育等四个方面改进。

英文摘要：

The principal-agent theory confirms that the share mode of the development rights of rural collective construction land between local governments and farmers in the dual principal-agent mechanism performs better than the monopoly mode of the development rights by the local governments in the single principal-agent mechanism. The performance is that, on the one hand, the share mode improves the monitoring efficiency; on the other hand, it leads to the moderate competition in obtaining land development rights and supplying the construction land. The allocation of the development rights of rural collective construction land is under the transition from the monopoly mode under the single principal-agent mechanism to the share mode under the dual principal-agent mechanism in China. However, the primary share mode of the development rights does not generate the expected results now. The policy implication indicates that the share mode of the development rights can be improved from the perfection of rural collective construction land transfer law, the definition of public interest, the information disclosure and the enhanced education on law and regulation.