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供应链契约稳定性及其在期权博弈视角下的优化
  • ISSN号:1003-207X
  • 期刊名称:中国管理科学
  • 时间:0
  • 页码:-
  • 分类:F274[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]广东工业大学经贸学院,广东广州510000, [2]南昌大学管理科学与工程系,江西南昌330031
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171061); 广东省自然科学基金项目(S2011010004970)
  • 相关项目:广义随机线性Markov切换系统非合作微分博弈理论及其在金融保险的应用
中文摘要:

供应链契约作为一种有效的经营合作模式,已得到理论界和企业界广泛认同,并在实际的产业化经营中占据主导地位。由于市场需求及价格波动的不确定性引发的机会主义行为,导致契约在执行过程中存在逆向选择和道德风险,严重影响了产业化组织的运行效率。为探索供应链契约模式的稳定性并制定有效的优化策略,通过静态博弈模型得出供应链契约模式价格波动区间,进而深入分析了决策参数对契约稳定性的影响。在此基础上,借助期权市场的风险规避功能,寻求风险外化通道以协调契约主体间的利益冲突,为探索供应链契约模式中供应商的高违约率问题提供新的视角。

英文摘要:

A supply chain contract mode is a market-oriented vertical product integration process from its production to sales.In the market economy,the execution of contracts is to maxmize profits,based on the assumptions of risk-neutral and fully rational game players.However,in a much volatile market,adverse selection and moral risk will occur when one player get losses under the normal supply chain contract mode.Therefore,high default rates for supply chain contracts will be vital to refrain from their executions without effective risk-sharing and behavior-constraint mechanisms.In this paper,the stability of supply chain contract modes are studied and optimization strategies are offered.Firstly,static game model is explored to obtain scopes of price fluctuations for supply chain contract modes.Secondly,detailed analysis is given to the impact of decision parameters on the stability of contract.Finally,a risk externality channel is sought to concert profit conflicts between contract parties,with the help of risk hedge function in options market.This no doubt offers a new prospective to solve the problem os high default rates in supply chain contract modes.Results show that such governance mechanisms as higher credits of contract parties,higher economic punishment coefficients,or more powerful default implementation measures,can help improve performance rates to some extent.But they can hardly eradicate market risks and occurrence of defaults.To solve high default rates for supply chain contract modes,it is vital to seek risk externality channel to coordinate the conflict of interest,with the help of risk treatment and prevention mechanisms in financial markets.As a result,market risk for supply chains can effectively be resolved in the options markets.From perspective of option games,by paying certain premiums under supply chain contract modes,supplier can effectively avoid market risks and meanwhile obtain benefits of rising prices.Manufacturers can fulfil steady efficient operations with higher incomes and more reliabl

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期刊信息
  • 《中国管理科学》
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 主管单位:中国科学院
  • 主办单位:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所
  • 主编:蔡晨
  • 地址:北京海淀区中关村北一条15号(北京8712信箱)
  • 邮编:100190
  • 邮箱:zgglkx@casipm.ac.cn
  • 电话:010-62542629
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1003-207X
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:11-2835/G3
  • 邮发代号:82-50
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 日本日本科学技术振兴机构数据库,中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国中国科技核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版)
  • 被引量:25352