本研究主要结合中国的制度背景,从理论上多维度地推演了公司治理各层面对公司社会责任的影响。并利用2005~2008年间在深、沪上市的776家非金融类公司组成的平衡面板数据为样本(共3104个观测值),运用广义最小二乘法(GLS)实证检验公司治理对公司社会责任的影响。实证结果表明,当公司治理水平高时,控股股东的机会主义行为受到限制,内部人也受到了更严格的监督,在一定程度上阻止了控股股东、内部人等利用自身的权力将公司利益占为己有,侵害其他相关利益者利益的行为,此时公司将对其他相关利益者履行更多的社会责任。
This paper theoretically analyses how corporate governance affects corporate social responsibility in consideration of the China's institutional background.Then it empirically verifies their relationships by adopting the generalized least squares method,with the balanced panel data of 776 Chinese non-financial listed companies from 2005 to 2008(3104 samples in all),The results show that firms with stronger corporate governance will prevent the controlling shareholders and the insiders from robbing the stakeholders' interests more effectively and will take more social responsibility.