中文摘要：

基于合同能源管理机制运作的节能服务产业快速发展，产生了可观的节能效益，体现出巨大的市场需求和发展潜力。然而，我国的节能服务企业大多为自负盈亏的中小型服务企业，它们难以获得银行贷款。基于此，本文从关系契约的视角对中小节能服务企业与银行之间的长期合作关系进行审视和处理，将中小型节能服务企业的企业特征融入关系契约博弈模型，依靠激励和惩罚双重机制分析银企合作行为和收益结果，论证了银行与中小节能服务企业建立长期关系契约的可行性，证实了长期关系契约模式适合中小节能服务企业特点，并能使银行和节能服务企业在长期合作中达到“共赢”。本文的研究结果为解决中小节能服务企业的融资瓶颈问题提供了新的思路。

英文摘要：

Nowadays, energy service based on energy performance contracting （EPC） is developing fast as an emerging industry, which has made considerable benefit from energy conservation and reflected the huge mar- ket demand and development potential. However, most of China＇s energy service companies （ESCO） are small and medium - sized self - financing companies so that it is difficult for them to obtain bank loans due to a lack of guarantee and credit history, and a long project cycle. To deal with this problem, from the view of relational con- tracts, the long- term relationship between small and medium -sized ESCOs and banks is examined in this pa- per. By integrating the characteristic of small and medium - sized ESCOs into the long - term relational contract game model, the behaviors and benefit results of bank - enterprise cooperation are explored designing the dual mechanism of incentives and penalty. Therefore, the feasibility of establishing long - term relational contract be- tween banks and small and medium - sized ESCOs is demonstrated. It is further confirmed that the long - term re- lational contract model is suitable for small and medium - sized ESCOs to achieve ＂win - win＂ situation in the long run. The proposed method ESCOs financing difficulties in and analyzing results will provide a new tool to solve small and medium- sized China.