中文摘要：

公司融资方式的选择和代理问题紧密相关，不同的融资方式将产生不同的公司治理效果，所以，融资方式选择对公司治理、中小投资者保护非常重要。本文采用延森和梅克林（JensenandMeckling，1976）的分析范式，从理论上清晰地论证了股票、可转债和公司债这三种融资方式对大股东与中小股东之间代理冲突的差异性影响。进一步的实证研究结果表明，公司债能够有效发挥治理功能，约束大股东的“掏空”行为；发行股票后，大股东的“掏空”行为却明显加强；没有发现可转债对大股东的“掏空”行为产生影响的经验证据。本文的研究结果对于公司融资政策制定、政府部门对公司融资监管具有一定的参考意义。

英文摘要：

A firm＇s choice of financing is tightly related to its agency problems, and different financing methods will have different corporate governance effects. Therefore, the choice of financing is of vital importance to corporate governance and investor protection. Along with Jensen and Meckling （1976）＇ analysis paradigm, the authors analyze the three financing methods disparate impact on agency conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders, which are stock, convertible debt and corporate bond. The empirical results show that, corporate bond can restrain large shareholders＇ tunneling and play a governance role. Large shareholders＇ tunneling will strengthen affer the firm＇s stock issue. And there is no significant evidence between convertible debt and large shareholders＇ tunneling. The findings of this paper have some significance for firms＇ financing decision and government＇s supervision