中文摘要：

家族企业有非常普遍的家族股权一股独大、存在家族传承意愿等特点，这可能使家族企业更看重中长期发展从而支持技术创新活动，也可能为了保护家族社会情感财富而抵制需要大量投入并具有较高风险的技术创新行为，因此需要实证证据检验。同时，一部分家族企业由国有股权转换而来，“国退民进”的所有权变更对于企业创新的影响鲜有研究进行讨论。运用2004年至2015年中国非金融类家族企业面板数据，基于Tobit模型和负二项回归方法，从研发投入、研发产出和研发产出影响力3个维度实证检验两权合一的治理模式对家族企业委托代理问题的影响，同时检验管家理论是否存在于中国家族企业公司治理和所有权变更对企业研发的影响中。研究结果表明，中国家族企业两权合一的治理模式显著降低了家族企业委托代理问题，对企业研发投入、研发产出和研发产出影响力形成支持效应；所有权由国有企业变为家族的企业，其研发产出和研发产出影响力明显低于其他企业，表明承接国有股份的家族企业创新效率更低。研究结论支持管家理论，即由于家族企业的两权合一治理模式以及高管与控股股东更紧密的私人联系，家族企业高管能更忠于家族企业长期利益，从而降低代理成本，提高企业创新水平。但是“国退民进”所有权变更之后企业的公司治理模式的变化并没有显著提高这些企业的创新水平。研究结论支持家族企业两权合一治理模式对创新的正面影响，丰富了家族企业管家理论的内涵。实证结果表明“国退民进”的所有权属性变化不能促进企业创新，建议家族企业在承接国有股权时仔细甄别，并合理调整股权结构，以促进企业创新和发展。

英文摘要：

Farnily businesses are common in concentrated family ownership and family heritage, which may make the family busi- nesses more focus on long-term development and therefore support technological innovation. Yet family-owned firms may resist technological innovation with high input and high risk due to protecting the family community emotional wealth. Meanwhile, some of Chinese family businesses are transferred from the state-ownership, and the influence of the changed ownership on the enter- prise innovation is rarely discussed in the literature. Using panel data of Chinese non-financial family-owned firms from 2004 to 2015, we apply TOBIT models and the negative binomial regression models to analyze how corporate governance issues and ownership change impact on firms＇ R＆D from three dimensions： R＆D investment, R＆D output and quality of R＆D output. The results show that the governance model of the Chinese family-owned firms has reduced the agency problem and formed the ＂supporting effect＂ to the R＆D investment and R＆D output and the quality of the output. R＆D output and output impact of family-owned firms whose ownership is transferred from state-owned are significantly lower than that of other firms, indicating that this kind of family-owned firms has lower innovation efficiency. Research conclusions support stewardship theory： Family-owned firms＇ executives are more faithful to the long-term interests of the firms, which reduce agency costs and raise the level of innova- tion due to the combination of ownership and control model of family-owned firms and closer personal connections between execu- tives and controlling shareholders. However, after the ownership turnover, the change of the corporate governance model of the finn does not significantly improve the level of innovation. The conclusions of the research support the positive effect of the two-right centralized corporate governance mode on the in- novation of family-owned firms, which enriches the connotation of the family bu