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中文摘要：
基于PPP项目的准公共物品属性,考虑损失规避型私人投资者在政府补偿情景下的投资决策问题。通过引入项目运营收益的相对补偿指数来定量描述政府补偿的契约问题;针对私人投资行为的损失规避特征,借助前景理论,以私人投资要求的特许收益作为其决策参考点,构建私人损失规避的效用函数,从而建立基于政府不同补偿情景的私人投资决策模型,并研究模型解的存在性及性质。最后,通过数值分析对所获结论进行验证。研究结果表明,私人在政府补偿情景下对项目的最优投资与其损失规避度并非一般意义上的正相关或负相关,而是取决于政府事前对补偿契约参数的不同设计。
英文摘要：
Based on the attribute of quasi-public goods for PPP project,we study the decision-making problem of loss-averse investor with governmental compensation.Firstly,a relative index to describe the operating compensation for the project is introduced to design a compensation contract for the private investor,which is contributed to the quantification of governmental compensation.Then considering the private loss-averse preference to the project investment,a utility function with the privately claimed concession revenue as its decision-making reference point is proposed using the prospect theory.Then the private decision-making model for the PPP project is constructed based on the governmental different compensation schemes,and the solution of the model is studied with regards to its existence and property.Finally,the obtained results are examined by the numerical analysis,indicating that the private optimal investment with governmental compensation is not generally positively or negatively correlated to its loss-averse degree,but depends on the different parameters of the compensation contract designed by the government a prior.
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