在联盟含内、外收益的支付结构下,根据动态博弈理论分析了企业的行为策略,研究了市场环境、管理成本和联盟过程对企业行为与治理机制的影响。研究结果表明:基于知识交易的未来预期和既往经历影响企业的行为决策,而行为决策决定了联盟收益及其演变轨迹。因而,当知识保护的成本增加时,建立知识保护机制的可能性降低,分享知识的时机可能提前。当协调成本增加时,进行关系协调并获取联盟内收益的可能性降低,退出联盟的时机可能提前。作为知识分享收益的决定因素,市场环境和分享机制的管理成本将影响联盟过程中的各项行为和治理决策。同时,在知识交易过程中保持知识收支平衡十分关键,若知识收支严重失衡,将导致联盟失败并给分享自有知识的企业造成损失。
Given the payoff structure containing the internal and external benefits of alliance, this paper analyzes the firms' be- havior strategies, investigates the influence of marketing environment, management cost, and the alliance experience on the firm' s behavior and governance mechanisms, by levcraging dynamic game theory. The research results indicate that the future expecta- tion and the past experience of knowledge exchanging have a significant impact on the behavior strategies of the alliance partici- pants, and the strategies determine the benefits and evolvement of the corresponding alliance. Therefore, when the management cost of knowledge protection increases, the participants are likely to abandon the protection mechanism and speed up sharing knowledge. When the coordination cost grows, the participants are more likely to abandon the coordination mechanism and speed up exiting the alliance. As the determinant of knowledge sharing benefits, the marketing environment and the management cost of knowledge sharing have influence on every behavior decision and governance mechanism choice in the process of alliance. Furthermore, it is important to maintain the symmetrical knowledge payoff between the two participants of the alliance. Otherwise, it would result in a loss of the firm that transfers knowledge and incur a failure of the alliance.